Essay Writer

1. #1Essay Outlineconstant

   Keys: Essay, writer, writing, history, political, science, biology, topic, write, claim, evidence, reasoning

   For an argumentative essay with a specific prompt and sources, you should follow a structured approach to ensure clarity and focus. Here's how it should be outlined and formatted:

   INTRODUCTION

   • Hook: Start with a compelling sentence to draw interest (e.g., a startling fact, rhetorical question, or quote relevant to the argument).
   • Context: Briefly introduce the topic and explain its relevance. Mention the prompt explicitly to ground the essay in its framework.
   • Thesis Statement: Clearly state the central argument or position in response to the prompt. This should be concise and debatable.

   BODY PARAGRAPHS (3) Each paragraph should focus on one main point supporting the thesis.

   Structure for Each Paragraph

   1. Topic Sentence: Introduce the paragraph's main argument or idea, directly tied to the thesis.
   2. Evidence: Include specific data, quotes, or examples from the provided sources. Always cite the source appropriately. Always reference the sources back to the evidence and avoid putting sources in parentheses.
   3. Analysis: Explain how the evidence supports the main argument. Highlight its relevance and connect it to the thesis.
   4. Counterargument and Rebuttal: Briefly present an opposing view from the sources and refute it with logical reasoning or additional evidence.
   5. Concluding Sentence: Summarize the paragraph’s main point and transition to the next argument.

   COUNTERARGUMENT PARAGRAPH (Required for Most Prompts)

   • Acknowledge a significant counterpoint or criticism of your argument, citing specific sources.
   • Refute this counterpoint with strong evidence or reasoning, showing why your thesis remains valid.

   CONCLUSION

   • Restate the Thesis: Summarize the central argument in a fresh way, showing its overall importance.
   • Summarize Key Points: Briefly revisit the main points discussed in the body paragraphs without repeating verbatim.
   • Broader Implications: Reflect on the significance of the argument or propose a course of action.

   FORMATTING GUIDELINES

   1. Introduction: Approximately 10% of the total essay length.
   2. Body Paragraphs: Dedicate the majority of the essay (about 80%). Each paragraph should focus on a single argument.
   3. Conclusion: Approximately 10% of the total essay length.
   4. Source Integration: Use in-text citations (e.g., MLA, APA, or another specified format). Ensure all evidence comes from the provided sources. Avoid unsupported claims.
   5. Transitions: Use clear and logical transitions between ideas and paragraphs.
   6. Formal Tone: Maintain an objective, formal tone throughout. Avoid first-person language unless explicitly allowed.
   7. Length: Follow word count requirements strictly and balance content across sections.
2. #2Outline Example

   Keys: Essay, writer, writing, history, political, science, biology, topic, write, claim, evidence, reasoning

   INTRODUCTION

   • Hook: Start with an engaging sentence.
     • Example: “Every year, millions of tons of plastic waste fill our oceans, threatening marine life and human health alike.”
   • Context: Provide a brief overview of the topic and its relevance to the prompt.
     • Example: “As the environmental crisis worsens, the debate about banning single-use plastics has become a focal point for policymakers and citizens alike.”
   • Thesis Statement: Clearly state your position in response to the prompt.
     • Example: “Single-use plastics should be banned because they harm ecosystems, contribute to climate change, and endanger human health.”

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   BODY PARAGRAPHS (At least 3)

   Structure for Each Paragraph

   1. Topic Sentence: State the argument of the paragraph.
      • Example: “Single-use plastics devastate marine ecosystems by introducing toxins and choking marine life.”
   2. Evidence: Introduce evidence with a lead-in and cite the source.
      • Example: “According to a 2023 report by the Ocean Conservancy, over 100,000 marine animals die annually from ingesting plastic debris (Ocean Conservancy, 2023).”
   3. Analysis: Explain how the evidence supports your argument.
      • Example: “This staggering loss disrupts food chains, diminishes biodiversity, and weakens ocean ecosystems, which are crucial for carbon absorption and climate regulation.”
   4. Counterargument and Rebuttal: Present a brief opposing view and refute it.
      • Example: “Critics argue that recycling programs can mitigate the issue, but studies reveal that less than 9% of plastic is effectively recycled (UNEP, 2022). This highlights the inefficacy of recycling alone, emphasizing the need for a ban.”
   5. Concluding Sentence: Summarize and transition.
      • Example: “Therefore, banning single-use plastics is essential to preserving marine life and sustaining ecological balance.”

   COUNTERARGUMENT PARAGRAPH

   1. Topic Sentence: Introduce the counterargument.
      • Example: “Some argue that banning single-use plastics could harm small businesses reliant on affordable packaging.”
   2. Evidence: Cite a source supporting this viewpoint.
      • Example: “A 2022 Small Business Association survey found that 70% of small businesses depend on plastic packaging for its low cost (SBA, 2022).”
   3. Rebuttal: Disprove the counterargument using logic or evidence.
      • Example: “However, governments can subsidize biodegradable alternatives, reducing costs for small businesses while achieving environmental goals.”
   4. Concluding Sentence: Tie back to your thesis.
      • Example: “Thus, economic concerns can be addressed without compromising environmental progress.”

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   CONCLUSION

   1. Restate the Thesis: Rephrase the central argument.
      • Example: “Banning single-use plastics is a critical step to safeguard our planet’s health.”
   2. Summarize Key Points: Briefly touch on the main arguments.
      • Example: “By reducing plastic pollution, curbing greenhouse gas emissions, and protecting human health, this policy offers a sustainable path forward.”
   3. Broader Implications: Reflect on the argument’s significance or call to action.
      • Example: “Governments, businesses, and individuals must unite to embrace sustainable alternatives and ensure a livable future for generations to come.”
   4. Closing Statement

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   FORMATTING WITH SENTENCE EXAMPLES

   • Transitions: Use phrases like “In addition,” “Furthermore,” “Conversely,” and “Therefore” to ensure smooth flow.
   • Formal Tone: Avoid personal pronouns. Instead of “I think,” use “Evidence suggests” or “This demonstrates.”
   • In-Text Citations: Follow formatting like (Author, Year) or (Source, Page) based on style guidelines.
     • Example: “Plastic production accounts for 8% of global oil consumption (WWF, 2021).”
3. #3Tone and Stylingconstant

   Keys: Essay, writer, writing, history, political, science, biology, topic, write, claim, evidence, reasoning

   How to best support {{user}} when writing their essay?

   • Always remember and reference all the information they give to you about the topic, prompt, and sources.

   • Write on a high-school level while still keeping your writing intelligent, clear, and grammatically correct with correct punctuation and spelling.

4. #4Sources

   Keys: Political, science, sources, essay, write, writing

   READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 1 The Electoral College and the American Idea of Democracy BY Martin Diamond [page 1] In 1967, a distinguished commission of the American Bar Association [referred to from here on as the ABA] recommended that the Electoral College be scrapped and replaced by a nationwide popular vote for the President, with provision for a runoff election between the top two candidates in the event no candidate received at least 40 percent of the popular vote. … The theme of this attack on the Electoral College is well summarized in a much-quoted sentence from the 1969 ABA report: “The electoral college method of electing a President of the United States is archaic, undemocratic, complex, ambiguous, indirect, and dangerous.” These six charges may seem a bit harsh on a system that has worked well for a very long time, but they do provide a convenient topical outline for a brief defense of the basic principles and procedures of the Electoral College. … [page 6] An “Undemocratic” System? The gravamen of the “undemocratic” indictment of the Electoral College rests on the possibility that, because votes are aggregated within the states by the general-ticket system, in which the winner takes all, a loser in the national popular vote may nonetheless become President by winning a majority of the electoral votes of the states. … [page 7] In fact, presidential elections are already just about as democratic as they can be. We already have one-man, one-vote—but in the states. Elections are as freely and democratically contested as elections can be—but in the states. Victory always goes democratically to the winner of the raw popular vote—but in the states. The label given to the propose reform, “direct popular election,” is a misnomer; the elections have already become as directly popular as they can be—but in the states. Despite all their democratic rhetoric, the reformers do not propose to make our presidential elections more directly democratic, they only propose to make them more directly national, by entirely removing the states from the electoral process. Democracy thus is not the question regarding the Electoral College, federalism is: should our presidential elections remain in part federally democratic, or should we make them completely nationally democratic? Whatever we decide, then, democracy itself is not at stake in our decision, only the prudential question of how to channel and organize the popular will. That makes everything easier. When the READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 2 question is only whether the federally democratic aspect of the Electoral College should be abandoned in order to prevent the remotely possible election of a President who had not won the national popular vote, it does not seem so hard to opt for retaining some federalism in this homogenizing, centralizing age. When federalism has already been weakened, perhaps inevitably in modern circumstances, why further weaken the federal elements in our political system by destroying the informal federal element that has historically evolved in our system of presidential elections? The crucial general-ticket system, adopted in the 1830s for reasons pertinent then, has become in our time a constitutionally unplanned but vital support for federalism. Also called the “unit rule” system, it provides that the state’s entire electoral vote goes to the winner of the popular vote in the state. Resting entirely on the voluntary legislative action of each state, this informal historical development, combined with the formal constitutional provision, has generated a federal element in the Electoral College which sends a federalizing impulse throughout our whole political process. It makes the states as states dramatically and pervasively important in the whole presidential selection process, from the earliest strategies in the nomination campaign through the convention and final election. Defederalize the presidential election—which is what direct popular election boils down to—and a contrary nationalizing impulse will gradually work its way throughout the political process. The nominating process naturally takes its cues from the electing process; were [page 8] the President to be elected in a single national election, the same cuing process would continue, but in reverse. It is hard to think of a worse time than the present, when so much already tends toward excessive centralization, to strike an unnecessary blow at the federal quality of our political order. The federal aspect of the electoral controversy has received inadequate attention; indeed, it is regarded by many as irrelevant to it. The argument has been that the President is the representative of “all the people,” and, hence, that he should be elected by them in a wholly national way, unimpeded by the interposition of the states. Unfortunately, the prevailing conception of federalism encourages this erroneous view. We tend nowadays to have a narrowed conception of federalism, limiting it to the reserved powers of the states. But by focusing exclusively on the division of power between the states and the central government, we overlook an equally vital aspect of federalism, namely, the federal elements in the central government itself. The Senate (which, after all, helps make laws for all the people) is the most obvious example; it is organized on the federal principle of equal representation of each state. Even the House of READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 3 Representatives has federal elements in its design and mode of operation. There is no reason, then, why the President, admittedly the representative of all of us, cannot represent us and hence be elected by us in a way corresponding to our compoundly federal and national character. The ABA Report, for example, begs the question when it says that “it seems most appropriate that the election of the nation’s only two national officers be by national referendum.” They are our two central officers. But they are not our two national officers; under the Constitution, they are our two partly federal, partly national officers. Why should we wish to change them into our two wholly national officers? Since democracy as such is not implicated in our choice—but only whether to choose our Presidents in a partly federally democratic or a wholly national democratic way—we are perfectly free prudentially to choose the partly federal rather than the wholly national … [page 9] Our consciences will be further eased when we note that the abhorrence of the federal aspect of the Electoral College—which causes the potential discrepancy between electoral and popular votes— cannot logically be limited to the Electoral College. It rests upon premises that necessitate abhorrence of any and all district forms of election. What is complained about in the Electoral College is endemic to all districted electoral systems, whether composed of states, or congressional districts, or parliamentary constituencies. If population is not exactly evenly distributed in all the districts (and it never can be), both in sheer numbers and in their political predispositions, then the possibility cannot be removed that the winner of a majority of the districts may not also be the winner of the raw popular vote. Regarding the British Parliament and the American Congress, for example, this is not merely a speculative matter or something that has not happened since 1888 … as in the case of the American presidency. [Note: Diamond wrote this in 1977, long before the “wrong winner” elections of 2000 and 2016.] It has happened more often and far more recently in England, where popular-minority governments are as possible as popular-minority Presidents are here. … … [page 10] … Americans have always believed that there is more to democracy itself than merely maximizing national majoritarianism; our idea of democracy includes responsiveness to local majorities as well. Further, because of our multiplicity of interests, ethnic groups, religions, and races, we have always believed in local democratic responsiveness to geographically based minorities whose interests may otherwise be utterly neglected … READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 4 [page 11] … What is so disturbing about the attack on the Electoral College is the way the reasoning and the rhetoric of the reformers depart from this traditional American posture toward democracy. They scant or simply ignore all the other considerations and put the presidential election process to the single test of national democratic numbers. In contrast, the fundamental premise of the traditional American idea of democracy is that democracy, like all other forms of government, cannot be the be-all and end all … rather, the political system must be made democratic enough and then structured, channeled, and moderated, so that on a democratic basis all the democratic considerations (in addition to the purely numerical) and all the other vital political considerations can be attended to. ... [page 12] Historically, the problem of democracy was not about minute margins of electoral victory, but about whether, say, 5 percent (the rich and wellborn few), should rule over the 95 percent (the poor many), to use the classical terms. … Democracy is not at stake in our elections, only the decision as to which shifting portion of an overall democratic electorate will temporarily capture executive office. … The irrelevance of the potential popular-vote/electoral-vote discrepancy to any important democratic value is illustrated if we consider the following question: Would the Electoral College reformers really regard it as a disaster for democracy if Franklin D. Roosevelt (or any liberal Democrat) had beaten Herbert Hoover (or any conservative Republican) in the electoral vote but had lost by a handful in the national popular vote? The question is not meant, of course, in any spirit of partisan twitting. Rather, it is intended to suggest that no [page 13] sensible person could seriously regard it as a disaster for democracy if—to use the language of the caricature—a coalition of the poor, of labor, of blacks, et al., has thus squeaked by a coalition of the rich, the powerful, the privileged, and the like. To point this out is not to depreciate the importance of such an electoral outcome for the course of public policy. It is only to deny that it would threaten or make a mockery of the democratic foundations of our political order. … READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 5 CITATION In references list Diamond, Martin. 1977. “The Electoral College and the American Idea of Democracy.” Washington: American Enterprise Institute. http://www.electoralcollegehistory.com/electoral/docs/diamond.pdf. Accessed 11 December 2024. In text If your citation uses a direct quote, use this format: (Diamond 1977, page number) If your citation does NOT use a direct quote, use this: (Diamond 1977) READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 6 Nobody Understands What a Popular Vote Presidential Election Would Mean BY Varad Mehta (2016) One popular scapegoat for presidential losers since the turn of the century is the Electoral College, the obscure, misunderstood body to which the Constitution assigns the responsibility of actually electing the president. Having watched their candidate win the popular vote yet lose the presidency, supporters of Hillary Clinton are understandably treating the Electoral College the way Goneril and Regan treated Lear. But such is the interest in excuses for losses, this debate doesn’t come up only in years where electors and the popular vote diverge. In 2012, though it attracted less notice, it was the GOP who had it out for the Electoral College. Faced with a fifth popular-vote loss in six elections and seeing another foot or two of brick piled atop the Democrats’ seemingly insurmountable “blue wall,” chagrined Republicans decided that their best bet for gaining a majority in the Electoral College wasn’t to submit a better application but to rewrite the rules of admission. Hence, Republican legislators in several states alighted on a scheme to divide their states’ electoral votes by congressional district instead of giving them all to the statewide winner. The motive for this gambit was transparent: If it had been in effect nationwide (as some GOP operatives desired), it would have delivered a Romney victory. Critics lambasted the idea as “vote rigging.” One even excoriated it as “a corrupt and cynical maneuver to frustrate [the] popular will.” Commentators noted that the proposal was likely to be self-defeating and could even backfire. By the end of 2014, enthusiasm for this bit of gamesmanship had faded to the point that it was exiled to a filing cabinet in some forgotten office. Creigh Deeds, the Democrat who lost the 2009 Virginia governor’s race, described the ploy best: “It’s sore losers, it’s a sore losers bill.” Four years later, it’s Democrats and progressives who are being sore losers about the Electoral College. The press has filled with laments that the Electoral College contradicts modern democratic principles, editorials calling for its abolition, and stories speculating about its future after it awarded the presidency to the popular-vote loser for the second time in 16 years. The divide between the popular vote and the electoral vote has brought renewed attention to the National Popular Vote plan, in which states would award their electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote. Four million people have signed a petition to have electors vote for Hillary Clinton when they meet on December 19. READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 7 Unlike conservatives after Romney lost, progressives can claim some sanction for their appeals in Hillary Clinton’s popular-vote triumph. But the irony is that both calls are just about equally opportunistic, because neither has a true claim to popular legitimacy. To be blunt, Clinton’s popular vote win is an illusion. I don’t mean that it doesn’t exist, but it is more apparent than real. Presidential elections are run according to the Electoral College. Candidates compete to win electoral votes; the popular vote is a by-product of that. To put it in terms of video games, the popular vote is a side quest. It’s impossible to say that Trump would have lost if the election had been contested on the basis of winning the popular vote because it wasn’t conducted that way — just as it’s impossible to say Romney would definitely have won an election with electors awarded by congressional districts. Ideally, a candidate gains both the popular vote and the Electoral College, but if only one can be had, in our system it’s the Electoral College that matters, and that’s the way it should be. Do we want a president who wins by running up the score in one or two states, or do we want a president who wins by garnering narrower victories in a wide array of states? Clinton won New York and California. Trump won Texas. And Florida. And North Carolina, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and even one electoral vote in Maine. He won the Electoral College by assembling a more politically and geographically diverse group of states than Clinton did. In our system, winning the Electoral College confers legitimacy because such a victory exemplifies the reality the Electoral College was created to ground in our political order: that the United States is a federal union of semi-sovereign states. Those states, not the Electoral College, were Hillary Clinton’s downfall. CITATION Mehta, Varad. 2016. “Nobody Understands What a Popular Vote Presidential Election Would Mean.” National Review, 16 November (published online). http://www.nationalreview.com/article/442231/popular-vote-hillary-didnt-really-win-it. Accessed 11 December 2024. In text (Mehta 2016) [note: there are no page numbers in this source] READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 8 So, You Say You Want To Get Rid Of The Electoral College, Eh? BY Jason Linkins One thing that the Electoral College has going for it, in terms of its own self-perpetuation, is that the occasion to discuss it only arises every four years. If you start talking about scrapping the system before the election, you’ll get shut down because no one likes “changing horses in midstream,” as they say. And if you start talking about it after the election, then you’re probably just plucking sour grapes from the vine. In fact, to avoid any accusations that I’m raising all of this because of some degree of post election bitterness, let me jump ahead a little bit and lay down an important marker: The notion that Clinton would have won the election in a system without an Electoral College, fully dependent on the popular vote, is a pretty dangerous assumption. My suspicion, in fact, is that the election probably went the same way in the parallel universe without an Electoral College. (Though I think that in the parallel universe where Clinton just used her State Department email, she’s probably doing okay.) That being said, a fully popular-vote election would have changed the nature of both campaigns and the way they were covered, and it’s in this realm where you’ll find most of the virtues of getting rid of the Electoral College system. Right now, at the outset of every presidential election, the Electoral College means the states immediately are sorted into two pots ― battlegrounds and monoliths. And if your state ends up in the second pot, you get to spend 16 months being entirely written off, while the battlegrounds effectively get shoved into a bubble. That’s too bad, because states like Massachusetts and Mississippi are fascinating places. Their residents deserve the opportunity to get up-close-and-personal with the presidential campaigns, too. And you never know what insights we’re losing by shunting entire states off into the phantom zone. Immigration was a huge issue this year. In Alabama, residents have some lived-in experiences that might have added a healthy dose of introspection to the campaign. But that opportunity was lost because no one cares what Alabama thinks during a presidential election. So the system hurts us by denying many Americans the opportunity to share key insights about their lives with the rest of the country. Of course, defenders of the Electoral College have similar concerns. In fact, there’s a larger worry that in a popular-vote system, campaigns might entirely forsake rural America because the votes in those regions are few and far between compared with big cities and their suburbs. READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 9 Well, we shouldn’t have a system that does that. But as Robert Speel notes over at Time magazine, the Electoral College didn’t prevent a mass avoidance of rural America anyway: … Four years ago, Republicans stuck in the sour grapes cycle floated the idea of carving themselves out of the Electoral College’s various entrapments. In Pennsylvania, for example, Republicans floated the idea of shifting from their winner-take-all electoral jackpot to a system that would have broken up the electoral rewards by congressional district. Such a move would have taken things in the wrong direction, in terms of fairness, but you can understand where they were coming from, as voters in the Keystone State’s major cities tended to ride herd over everyone else. And only a partisan or a cynic could feel good about their fellow citizens thinking they didn’t really have a voice. Obviously, for those who had those concerns in 2012, the Electoral College system brought some measure of vindication in 2016, as Pennsylvania shifted back to the GOP all on its own. Nevertheless, it can’t be healthy for residents of Pennsylvania to feel, perpetually, like they are pitted against each other every four years. A popular-vote system might help alleviate the bitterness. And third-party interaction with the Electoral College system truly is a mess. For starters, the way the system works paves the way for the perception that third-party candidates are spoilers, not players, with elections ending with anger being hurled their way for distorting the result. I don’t personally hold to this notion ― if you’re a major party candidate with comparatively unlimited resources at your disposal, you’ve got no one to blame but yourself if Jill Stein’s votes would have won you Michigan. But the bitterness toward third-party candidates has a way of lingering, creating one of those “nobody learns and nobody hugs” situations. And who can say whether third-party candidates are getting an honest reflection of their base with the Electoral College, which adds a layer of strategic thinking that many voters likely have to grapple with as they arrived at their polling places? Seems to me that many people are more likely to vote third party if they’re confident that the majority in their state is going to shield them from the worst outcome, and less likely to do so if they feel their fellow voters won’t deliver the next-best option. Suffice it to say, Americans have the right to challenge the hegemony of the two-party system. It’s not clear that the Electoral College gives them a fair shot. It certainly doesn’t seem to provide incentives for alternate parties to evolve. It seems to me that if you want to come at the Electoral College, daggers drawn, you should do so out of respect for all the voices that don’t get heard during elections, either because the candidates READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 10 and the media steer clear of them entirely, or because they get submerged in the system. Changing the system out of the belief that your candidates would have always thrived if the popular vote prevailed is a good way to set yourself up for disappointment. For all anyone knows, if Clinton had barnstormed the West Coast and the non-New Hampshire parts of the Northeast, her intense focus on professional-class concerns may have left voters in those states feeling just as cold to her as they were in Wisconsin and Michigan. All that being said, the Electoral College still has a few things going for it. I mean, if you like coloring maps, it’s simply the best. More to the point, the Electoral College is a good system for everyone who doesn’t relish the idea of the election cycles ending in a spate of never-ending recount lawsuits. As Richard Posner pointed out over at Slate four years ago, one thing the Electoral College helps to provide is a sense of “certainty” about the outcome. You know ... most of the time: A dispute over the outcome of an Electoral College vote is possible — it happened in 2000 — but it’s less likely than a dispute over the popular vote. The reason is that the winning candidate’s share of the Electoral College invariably exceeds his share of the popular vote. In last week’s election, for example, Obama received 61.7 percent of the electoral vote compared to only 51.3 percent of the popular votes cast for him and Romney. (I ignore the scattering of votes not counted for either candidate.) Because almost all states award electoral votes on a winner-take-all basis, even a very slight plurality in a state creates a landslide electoral-vote victory in that state. A tie in the nationwide electoral vote is possible because the total number of votes — 538 — is an even number, but it is highly unlikely. Of course a tie in the number of popular votes in a national election in which tens of millions of votes are cast is even more unlikely. But if the difference in the popular vote is small, then if the winner of the popular vote were deemed the winner of the presidential election, candidates would have an incentive to seek a recount in any state (plus the District of Columbia) in which they thought the recount would give them more additional votes than their opponent. The lawyers would go to work in state after state to have the votes recounted, and the result would be debilitating uncertainty, delay, and conflict — look at the turmoil that a dispute limited to one state, Florida, engendered in 2000. With that in mind, if you really want to tear down an election ritual of archaic origin that would pave the way for a more just and equitable election, I highly recommend we all aim our fire at this absurd tradition that elections have to be held on a Tuesday in November, which well and truly sucks for minorities and working people. That’s a worthier idea for a piece of lame-duck electoral reform, and frankly, it’s more in tune with the mood of the country. READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 11 If we pull that off, and still feel kind of hinky about the Electoral College, then sure, I’m up for anything. Let’s get rid of it and see what we learn. But just so you know, there’s no guarantee you’re going to like the result. CITATION In references list Linkins, Jason. 2016. “So, You Say You Want To Get Rid Of The Electoral College, Eh?” Huffington Post, 15 November. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/electoral college_us_582b66bee4b0aa8910bd3ca5. Accessed 11 December 2024. In text (Linkins 2016) [note: there are no page numbers in this source] READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 12 A Calamitous Compact BY Darin DeWitt and Thomas Schwartz [page 791] California is the home of direct democracy, recalls, Mickey Mouse, and a devilishly ingenious stratagem to neuter the electoral college and elect presidents by nationwide popular vote, or more accurately, by plurality rule.… … The result would be a procedural calamity in pursuit of quixotic goals … MISCHIEF This is of five kinds. Legal Instability Its champions brag that the compact requires no Constitutional amendment, but for that very reason it would give us a political system wanting in durability and predictability. If states can join the compact by legislative act, they can as easily withdraw. A few withdrawals, even a single one, could break the compact by reducing its electoral votes to fewer than 270. Withdrawal would most likely follow a state election that replaced Democrats with Republicans as dominant party. Proponents of the compact tout bi-partisan support, but the states that have ratified it are all bright blue, and … it is rather opposition to the compact that is somewhat bipartisan: the legislators who voted for it are almost all Democrats. The compact has been vetoed, moreover, by four governors, all Republicans, and signed by nine, all Democrats.… From the point of view of electoral advantage, a state might as well withdraw (or not join to begin with) because the compact would make a difference only in a pivotal state forced to elect a president opposed by most of its voters. True, having joined the compact to encourage others to join, a state might be reluctant to withdraw without knowing in advance that it is both pivotal and on the wrong side of the national popular vote. But it can always withdraw after popular votes are counted but before the Electoral College meets. The compact does ban withdrawals during the six months before a president’s inauguration, but it provides no penalty. Interstate compacts can be enforced by Federal courts, but enforceable ones require Congressional consent according to Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution. Not only is that not READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 13 in the offing but the compact itself does not make it a condition of implementation. Maybe the legislators and governors who originally ratified the compact feel bound to enforce it. But in all likelihood they would be long gone when the issue of enforcement arose. … [page 792] Uncooperative Electors … [C]consider what can happen under the compact. Say a state is bright blue but the Republican candidate for president noses out the Democrat nation-wide. Then the state’s chief election officer would have to appoint the Republican slate of electors. There is a fair chance some of those electors would not go along with the compact. Yes, they would prefer the Republican candidate. But they might have a stronger, principled preference for discrediting the compact.… If the states in the compact commanded little more than 270 electoral votes, a handful of electors opposed to the compact could block its effect. That prospect is quite realistic because of how the compact separates the two parties. Democratic supporters wish to assure us that Republican electors would adhere to the compact, but they cannot. Under the present system, electors are pledged to vote for their parties’ nominees, but if the compact took effect, some Republican electors, many or few, might feel obliged instead to uphold their national anti-compact platform plank. Republican state conventions might even free their electors to do so, if only as a threat to force Democratic agreement to withdraw. At the very least, Republican electors across the country might coordinate their votes to protest the compact without electing the Democrat. Because opposition to the compact is somewhat bipartisan some Democratic electors might do likewise. Close Votes and Recounts Popular votes with margins of less than one percent have occurred surprisingly often: in 1880, 1884, 1888, 1960, 1968, and 2000. The compact would increase the likelihood of close popular votes because it is popular votes that candidates would seek, competing to attract support and turn out supporters regardless of location. Currently, by contrast, electoral votes must be won in state-wide lumps, and those do not correlate closely with popular votes. The trouble is that close votes prompt challenges and the demand for recounts. But as we saw in the Tallahassee tally hassle of 2000, when the original count is close, the recount has to be polity-wide: a fair one cannot be confined to counties or precincts cherry picked by one or both sides. Under the compact, any recount would have to be READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 14 nationwide. It would have to wend its way through fifty-one election codes and ballot forms and thousands of county bureaucracies, and it would have to do so within 35 days (the legal deadline for state certification of elections) or at most 41 days [42 days since 2022] (when electors meet to vote). That is almost certainly infeasible, and it would remain so even if Congress extended the deadline to January 19…. Far from overstating this problem, we have given proponents the benefit of the doubt by assuming that, unless all states joined the compact, the joiners could somehow compel the other states [page 793] to send them certified and timely vote tallies and to recount them, or at least begin the process, whenever nationwide totals were close. Obviously no state has the power to do that. Nor could courts compel recounts unless within-state results were close or otherwise contestable. The problem of compulsion would disappear and efficient recounts would be easier if the federal government ran presidential elections. But that would require a Constitutional amendment—the very thing proponents brag about avoiding. Manipulation of Vote Counts The compact would magnify the incentive politicians have to manipulate vote counts. They do that already, but their incentive is limited by the fact that few states are swing states. By making every vote count, regardless of location, the compact would lift that limit and encourage officials everywhere to play partisan accordion with the recorded vote. Local election officers could make it easier or harder for voters to register, allow more or fewer forms of identification, and accept or reject ballots cast late or in the wrong precinct. And it is they who decide the location and advertisement of polling places. At the legislative level, Democratic majorities could boost their party’s share of the vote by allowing convicted felons, sixteen-year olds, and noncitizens to vote (yes, states can let noncitizens vote, and in the nineteenth century some did). Republican majorities could in turn toughen voter-identification requirements, ban provisional and foreign-language ballots, fund fewer polling places, and increase penalties for fraud. If partisan majorities do not do more of that already it is because they are not strong enough in closely divided states, and in solidly partisan states they have no reason to manipulate statewide votes (for president, governor, senator, or anything else)…. READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 15 Narrowed Support The current system rewards candidates for winning pluralities in states that are numerous and populous but not for winning large majorities in those states. By contrast, the compact would let candidates profit from ever more support in fewer states: the victor would have no incentive to spread his support across territorial or other divisions of the population. A nationwide plurality could represent a fair diversity of interests, but there is no reason why it should. Assuming that numerous states are a rough proxy for numerous interests, the compact would encourage candidates to appeal to narrower, less diverse interests than they do now. … CITATION In references list DeWitt, Darin and Thomas Schwartz. 2016. “A Calamitous Compact.” PS: Political Science and Politics 49 (4: October): 791-796. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096516001396. In text If your citation uses a direct quote, use this format: (DeWitt and Schwartz 2016, page number) If your citation does NOT use a direct quote, use this: (DeWitt and Schwartz 2016) READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 16 A Not-So-Calamitous Compact: A Response to DeWitt and Schwartz BY John R. Koza [page 797] The National Popular Vote interstate compact would replace the current state-by-state winner take-all method of awarding electoral votes with a system in which the president would be the candidate receiving the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The compact would take effect when enacted by states possessing a majority of the electoral votes—that is, enough to elect a president (270 of 538). After becoming effective, the compact would award all of the electoral votes of the enacting states to the presidential candidate receiving a plurality of the popular votes from all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Thus, when the Electoral College meets in mid-December, the candidate who received the most popular votes nationwide on Election Day would have enough electoral votes to be elected president. A total of 2,794 state legislators have sponsored or cast a recorded vote in favor of the National Popular Vote compact. The compact has been enacted into law by 11 jurisdictions possessing 165 electoral votes (Hawaii, Washington state, California, Illinois, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey, New York, Maryland, and the District of Columbia), and it will take effect when enacted by states with 96 more electoral votes. The compact has been approved by at least one state legislative chamber in a dozen additional states with 103 electoral votes (Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Oregon).[1] … Legal Instability DeWitt and Schwartz say: “Champions brag that the compact requires no Constitutional amendment, but for that very reason it would give us a political system wanting in durability and predictability.” They assert that a state could withdraw from the compact during a presidential election campaign or after the popular votes are counted but before the Electoral College meets. [page 798] In fact, no state—whether operating under either a state winner-take-all statute or the National Popular Vote compact— may, after Election Day, change its method of appointing presidential electors [1 Editor’s note: these numbers have changed since 2016. As of 2024, there are 18 jurisdictions (17 states plus the District of Columbia), containing 209 electoral votes, that have enacted the compact into law.] READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 17 and then appoint different presidential electors. The Constitution … gives Congress the power to “determine the Time of choosing the Electors” and Congress … has designated one specific day (“the Tuesday after the first Monday in November”) as the day for appointing presidential electors. Federal law … provides an additional backstop by treating a state’s appointment of its presidential electors as “conclusive” only if based on “laws enacted prior to” Election Day. Additionally, the notion of a state legislature enthroning the second-place candidate as president by changing the “rules of the game” after Election Day is not only politically preposterous, but contrary to law. … … [T]he compact does not allow its repeal to become effective during a six-month “blackout” period starting July 20 of a presidential election year and ending with the Inauguration on January 20. This six-month period includes the nominating conventions, the campaign, Election Day, the Electoral College meeting in mid-December, counting of votes by Congress in early January, and Inauguration Day. DeWitt and Schwartz incorrectly assert that an interstate compact is not really binding and there is no sanction but the consciences of its founders. In fact, an interstate compact is not only a legally binding contract between states, but is one of the few ways by which a state legislature may bind future legislatures…. Once a state voluntarily enters into any interstate compact, a state cannot withdraw from the compact except in the manner permitted by the compact itself. As the US Supreme Court succinctly ruled, “A compact is, after all, a contract.” The courts have never allowed any state to withdraw from any interstate compact without following the procedure for withdrawal specified by the compact itself. Federal and state courts have routinely and consistently enforced the US Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Impairments Clause as applied to compacts. DeWitt and Schwartz incorrectly assert that an interstate compact is only enforceable by federal courts if it has received congressional consent. In the 1991 case of McComb v. Wambaugh, federal courts enforced a compact that did not require (and had not received) congressional consent (and that had a two-year delay on withdrawal) saying, “Having entered into a contract, a participant state may not unilaterally change its terms. A Compact also takes precedence over statutory law in member states.” Additionally, state courts have independent power to invalidate a state’s attempted withdrawal contrary to a compact’s withdrawal procedure. … READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 18 Uncooperative Electors DeWitt and Schwartz’s statement that legislative support for the compact has been almost wholly Democratic describes a majority (but not all) of the early adopters of the compact. However, because the emotions associated with the 2000 election have now largely subsided, the most recent legislative floor votes were a bipartisan 40–16 vote in the Republican-controlled Arizona House, a bipartisan 28–18 vote in the Republican-controlled Oklahoma Senate, a bipartisan 57–4 vote in the Republican-controlled New York Senate, and a bipartisan 37–21 vote in the Democratic-controlled Oregon House. The most recent state legislative committee actions in 2016 were unanimous favorable votes by Republican-controlled committees in Missouri and Georgia. Polls in numerous states and nationally typically show about three quarters of voters (including about two-thirds of Republicans) believe that the president should be the candidate who receives the most popular votes nationwide. … DeWitt and Schwartz incorrectly claim that a mere “handful of electors opposed to the compact could block its effect.” However, the compact is considerably less susceptible to disruption by faithless electors than the current system. The compact gives the national popular vote winner at least 270 electoral votes from the compacting states. In practice, the national popular vote winner would also receive a substantial cushion of electoral votes from non-compacting states that he or she won (on average, about half of the remaining electoral votes). … Alternatively, a state could enact Pennsylvania’s existing law empowering each party’s presidential nominee to directly appoint his or her own presidential electors. Manipulation of Vote Counts DeWitt and Schwartz say: “The compact would magnify the incentive politicians have to manipulate vote counts. They do that already, but their incentive is limited by the fact that few states are swing states. By making every vote count, regardless of location, the compact would lift that limit and [page 799] encourage officials everywhere to play partisan accordion with the recorded vote.” In fact, the current state-by-state winner-take-all system greatly magnifies the payoff for vote manipulation in swing states—and hence the incentive to manipulate. A mere 537 popular votes in Florida in 2000 flipped enough electoral votes to decide the presidency in an election with a nationwide READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 19 537,179-vote margin. Astonishingly, while arguing that the current state-by-state system minimizes the incentive to manipulate votes, DeWitt and Schwartz cite a paper (Kosuke and King 2004) in their own paper making a strong case that this 537-vote margin was the result of Florida’s illegal counting of 680 late absentee ballots. DeWitt and Schwartz’s statement that the current system “quarantines … manipulation of vote counts … within a small number of states” offers little comfort, given the reality that this “small number of states” are the battleground states that actually decide who wins the presidency. … Narrowed Support … Even after acknowledging that the compact would make “every vote count, regardless of location,” DeWitt and Schwartz puzzlingly assert that it would “encourage candidates to appeal to narrower, less diverse interests” and encourage candidates to campaign in “fewer states.” Given that every 2012 general-election campaign event was in just 12 states (and over two-thirds were in just four states), one wonders just how many “fewer states” DeWitt and Schwartz think would receive attention in a national popular vote for president. The actual observed behavior of presidential candidates (advised by the nation’s most astute political strategists) inside battleground states indicates that they campaign broadly throughout the jurisdiction involved when the winner is the candidate receiving the most popular votes. When real-world presidential candidates campaign in a state such as Ohio (which alone accounted for over a quarter of the nation’s general-election campaign events in 2012), they do not appeal to narrow interests; they do not concentrate on heavily populated urban areas; and it would be inconceivable that they would neglect three-quarters of the electorate. Instead, they campaign broadly throughout the state precisely because “every vote counts, regardless of location.” … Candidates campaigned similarly in the three other major battleground states (Florida, Virginia, and Iowa) which, along with Ohio, accounted for over two-thirds of all general-election campaign events. READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 20 Closer Votes and Recounts DeWitt and Schwartz claim the current system “quarantines … recounts of close votes …within a small number of states.” [page 800] In fact, the current state-by-state winner-take-all system does precisely the opposite. It has repeatedly created artificial crises that would not have occurred if the winner were simply the national popular vote winner. The current system has generated five litigated state counts in our nation’s 57 presidential elections. It created an artificial crisis in 2000 because of the tiny state-level margin of 537 popular votes in Florida in an election with a nationwide popular-vote margin of 537,179. Similarly, it created an artificial crisis in 1876 because of small state-level margins (889, 922, and 4,807) in an election with a nationwide margin of 254,694. In Hawaii in 1960, there was litigation over a 115-vote state-level margin in an election with a nationwide margin of 118,574. Were it not for state winner-take-all laws, all five of these trivially small state-level margins would have been irrelevant almanac footnotes in elections with decisive six-digit nationwide margins. Far from being a quarantine, the current state-by-state system produces unnecessary infections. [The] historically observed probability of statewide recounts can be used to estimate the probability of a national recount. One should expect a recount of a single-pool plurality-vote national election once in every 174 presidential elections—that is, once in every 696 years. In fact, a national recount is even less likely, because the probability of a recount diminishes with the size of the voting pool. The reason why the current system gratuitously generates so many unnecessary disputes (5 litigated state counts in a mere 57 presidential elections) is that the nation’s 57 presidential elections were really 2,237 separate state-level elections—each a separate opportunity for a razor-thin state-level margin…. DeWitt and Schwartz also suggest that the appropriate trigger for a nationwide recount should be a 1% margin. “Popular votes with margins of less than one percent have occurred surprisingly often: in 1880, 1884, 1888, 1960, 1968, and 2000.” But a 1% nationwide margin corresponds to 1,300,000 votes in a present-day presidential election. In reality, recounts shift very few votes…. READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Electoral College 21 Applying the Central Limit Theorem to the historically observed distribution of shifts resulting from statewide recounts … [t]he probability is 99.85% that the original apparent loser would not gain more than 21,582 votes in a national recount. To put in perspective the inability of a shift of 21,582 to affect the outcome of a national election, recall that the closest nationwide margin (1960) in a presidential election in the past century was 118,574; the next three closest nationwide margins (1916, 1968, and 2000) were about a half million votes each; and all the remaining margins were in the millions. DeWitt and Schwartz’s claim that a 1,300,000-vote nationwide margin would warrant a national recount is therefore unrealistic. CITATION In references list Koza, John R. 2016. “A Not-So-Calamitous Compact: A Response to DeWitt and Schwartz.” PS: Political Science and Politics 49 (4: October): 797-804. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096516001402. In text If your citation uses a direct quote, use this format: (Koza 2016, page number) If your citation does NOT use a direct quote, use this: (Koza 2016)

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   READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 1 Electoral Systems BY David M. Farrell [page 3] Apart from their primary function of ensuring the smooth running and accepted legitimacy of the system, electoral systems are designed to fulfil [sic] a number of other – often conflicting – functions, such as reflecting the wishes of voters, producing strong and stable governments, electing qualified representatives and so on. In selecting a particular design of electoral system, the “electoral engineers” have to take important decisions about which function to stress most. As a result, no two countries have the same electoral system. … [page 11] The precise meaning of the term “representation” can vary markedly. The basic distinction is between a “microcosm” and a “principal-agent” conception of representation (McLean 1991; Reeve and Ware 1992). The first of these is associated with proponents of proportional electoral systems, the second with supporters of non-proportional systems. A classical exponent of the microcosm view was John Adams, one of the founding fathers of the USA, who said that parliament “should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel, reason, and act like them” (quoted in McLean 1991: 173). Taken literally this perspective is similar to the governing principle behind public opinion polls: that is, the notion of a representative sample. In other words a society which is made up of the following sorts of ratios – men:women 50:50; urban:rural 70:30 ; middle class:working class 40:60; black:white 20:80 – should elect a parliament which reflects these ratios in microcosm. To put it another way, parliament should be a “representative sample” of the population. Obviously it is impossible to achieve a perfect representative sample, but the aim should be to get as close as possible to it. On this view, as Raymond Plant (1991: 16) explains, “the representativeness of a parliament is accounted for by its proportionality.” It is a sociological mirroring of society. According to the microcosm conception of representation, therefore, it is the pattern of composition of the parliament that matters; but, according to the principal-agent conception, it is the decisions of the parliament that matters. The basis of the principal-agent conception is the notion of one person acting on behalf of another. The representative is elected by the people to represent their interests. In this case, even if the parliament comprises a preponderance of 50-year-old, white, middle class males, it is representative providing it is seen to be taking decisions on behalf of the voters. It is 1 READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 2 less important that the parliament is statistically representative of voters, and more important that it acts properly in the interests of the citizens; composition is less important than decisions. In his excellent summary of these two positions, Iain McLean (1991: 172) observes that each “seems entirely reasonable, but they are inconsistent.” There is no reconciliation’ either you support one perspective or your support the other. Either you are in favour [sic] of a parliament that is a microcosm of society, or, instead, you have a [page 12] view of parliament that stresses its ability to act properly in the interests of all citizens. Ultimately it is a normative judgement [sic] call … On the basis of his review of 14 models of democracy and their potential fit with alternative electoral systems, Katz’s conclusions is deliberately and unapologetically non-committal: “there is no universally correct, most democratic electoral system …”… Once we delve more deeply into the question of specific electoral system consequences, however, it is possible to find other more empirical areas where conclusions can be drawn. Some systems are apparently associated with greater degrees of governmental stability; some systems promote smaller parties better than others; there are effects on the nature of parliamentary representation … and on the organization and campaign styles of political parties; and there are effects on the representation of women and ethnic minorities. … … [page 19] … For its supporters the beauty of [first-past-the-post (FPTP)] is its simplicity: to get elected a candidate must win a ‘plurality’ of the vote. This does not mean that the candidate has more votes than all the other candidates combined. It is not necessary to win an overall majority of the vote: providing the candidate has at least one vote more than each of the other candidates, then he or she is declared the victor. … [page 20] In discussions about [FPTP] and its possible reform, three main themes resonate: simplicity, stability and constituency representation. First, the system is undoubtedly easy to understand; it is simple and straightforward. In the polling booth, all the voters have to do is mark an ‘X’ (or in some countries, pull a lever) next to their preferred candidate. The result is also simple to understand: whoever gets the most votes … wins. … 2 READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 3 Second, the argument is usually made that [FPTP] produces stable government and, by extension, a stable political system. For instance, British governments generally enjoy large parliamentary majorities. … Under [FPTP] the government, so the argument goes, is not hostage to the vagaries of relying on small (often extremist) parties for legislative support. The voters know that the party with the most seats forms the next government, unlike the situation common, say, in the rest of Western Europe [with proportional electoral systems,] where governments are formed as a result of agreements struck between party leaders in smoke-filled rooms after the election. The ‘result’ (that is, the determination of who forms the government) is more democratic and fairer. Third, a central feature of political life under [FPTP] is constituency [i.e., personal] representation. … Each member of the parliament represents a constituency. Each voter has a constituency MP [that is, a member of parliament] who can be approached. This is in stark contrast to the situation in, say, Israel where the entire country is one vast constituency … … [page 21] [FPTP] is such an easy system to understand that it requires little explanation – and certainly nothing like the detailed explanations required for the other systems in later chapters. … … [page 47] [FPTP] … remains one of the most commonly used systems in the world … … This chapter has shown some of the obvious disadvantages of [FPTP]: it produces disproportionate results; smaller parties are underrepresented; supporters of smaller parties waste their votes. But, as we have seen, [FPTP] does also have a number of apparent advantages, particularly in terms of its promotion of single-party, stable governments; the central role of constituency representation; and its much trumpeted simplicity. … … [page 68] The [majoritarian] electoral systems which we have looked at so far … share a number of features in common. First, they are constituency-based: that is, the country is divided into a series of geographically defined constituencies, each represented by one [member]. Second and related, voting is candidate-based, not party-based: that is, voters choose between the candidates put forward by the 3 READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 4 parties. In other words, these systems can be characterized as consisting of the “direct” election of MPs rather than their “indirect” election via party lists. … In this chapter we deal with one of the most commonly used family of electoral systems, the list systems of proportional representation…. One point must be stressed at the outset. There is no single [proportional] system – there are considerable variations in the different types of [proportional] systems.… [page 69] The basic principle behind the list systems is simple enough. Each party draws up a list of candidates in each constituency. The size of the lists is based on the number of seats to be filled. In its most basic form, voters vote for parties instead of candidates.… The proportion of votes each party receives determines the number of seats it can fill.… … [page 89] … [T]he Netherlands has one of the most proportional electoral systems in the world. It uses [the d’Hondt method] with a very large district magnitude. In effect, the entire country is one constituency … … The operation of PR [that is, proportional representation] in the Netherlands has been seen as a major factor in the long-standing tradition of successful political “accommodation” in Dutch politics. But this has not stopped the emergence of a debate about electoral reform … First, there is some attention to the lack of [links between members of parliament (MPs) and their constituents], inevitable given the absence of parliamentary constituencies. Ken Gladdish refers to academic surveys in the early 1970s which found that Dutch citizens considered their MPs as largely irrelevant to their local concerns. In the case of one of these surveys it was found that “At the national level, members of the Royal Family turned out to be the object of slightly more frequent contacts than individual MPs” (Gladdish 1991: 101). This attitude of indifference is reciprocated by the Dutch MPs. A cross-national survey of parliamentarians in the early 1980s found that, in “the task of mediation between groups and individuals,” British and German MPs “scored highly”; by contrast, this activity “was virtually ignored by the Dutch” (Gladdish 1991: 102). … 4 READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 5 [page 95] In their various forms, the [proportional systems] have proved to be the most popular with the electoral engineers, and for good reason. These systems undoubtedly give the greatest amount of control to the party headquarters, particularly in the case of closed lists where the voters have no say over which politicians are elected, but also in the case of those systems with larger district magnitudes where the average voter has little chance of knowing much about the individual candidates. [Proportional] systems are also popular with many political reformers because of their greater proportionality, and also because, at least in theory, they allow greater scope for implementing policies to increase the representation of women and minority ethnic groupings … CITATION In references list Farrell, David M. 2001. Electoral Systems. Houndsmills, UK: Palgrave. In text If your citation uses a direct quote, use this format: (Farrell 2001, page number) If your citation does NOT use a direct quote, use this: (Farrell 2001) 5 READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 6 A Treatise on the Election of Representatives BY Thomas Hare [page 3] … When the actions of the society are governed by the majority, in the sense of numbers, the majority may be variously understood. It may be, either a majority consisting of the more numerous of two bodies supporting respectively two contrary [candidates], or of the more numerous of several bodies supporting respectively several distinct [candidates]. If … ten candidates were offered to the choice of fifty persons, that [those fifty] might select one of the ten, six of the fifty persons might form the majority, and the forty-four have no voice. If there be no law—as in our electoral system[1] there is no law—which requires more than [50%], or any definite proportion of the entire body, to form an [page 4] effectual majority, the six must prevail … [page 7] … … It is impossible to suppose a popular form of government in which the votes must not be counted. The problem … is, in what manner the individuals composing the entire community are to be classed so that no opinions or interests shall be unheard, or extinguished, in representation. [page 8] Most of the advocates for the amendment of our system of representation seem content with, or to despair of obtaining anything better than, a division of the country into certain districts or localities. … Supposing there were a contest between [two parties] … and the proportion in which these [parties] is found in every locality to be … two to three, the majority of every constituency would, of course, elect a representative of the [larger party]. If five constituencies [makes up] the entire number [of constituencies], there would be in the representative assembly five members for the [larger party] and none for the [smaller party]; whilst, in justice, the majority and the minority ought to stand in the constituted assembly in the same proportion as their constituents, that is, three against two. It is clear … that, by defeat in every constituency of the detached minorities, the less numerous class have no means of meeting their adver- [1 Editor’s note: by “our” electoral system, Hare means the United Kingdom, which used (and still uses) first-past-the-post to elect members of the House of Commons.] 6 READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 7 [page 9] saries in the representative council, but are previously cut off in detail. “Le but du gouvernement représentatif est de mettre publiquement en présence, et aux prises les grands intérêts, les opinions diverses, que se partagent la société … dans la juste confiance que, de leurs débats, sortirent la connaissance et l’adoption des lois et des mesures que conviennent le mieux aux pays en général. Ce but n’est atteint que par le triomphe de la vraie majorité, la minorité constamment présente et entendue. Si la majorité est déplacée par artifice il y a mensonge. Si la minorité est d’avance hors du combat, il y a oppression. Dans l’un ou l’autre cas, le gouvernement représentatif est corrompu.”2[Translation: “The goal of representative government is to make the great interests and diverse opinions that divide society square off publicly against each other … in the just confidence that out of their debates will come knowledge and the adoption of laws and measures that best suit the country as a whole. This goal is not attained except by the triumph of the true majority, with the minority always present and heard. If the majority is fraudulently removed, there is falsehood. If the minority is excluded from the fight in advance, there is oppression. In either case, representative government is corrupted.”] … … [One counter-argument states that, if] liberalism be triumphant in one constituency, conservatism … is triumphant in another. [This counter-]argument is as untenable, as the principle is dangerous. It is not [true] that the opinions sup- [page 10] pressed by the electoral voice at one place are expressed in those of another. It has been truly said that “the separation of parties according to localities does not even approach completeness. The number of localities in which any given opinions prevail are not proportioned to the general prevalence of those opinions. Large political parties are widely scattered and intermixed throughout the country.”3 … [page 28] The election of a representative by a combination of minorities supposes a community of sentiment in those who combine…. In order to render this arrangement possible, it is necessary to prescribe what shall be the extent or numbers [of voters in] the new constituency which is thus to be created…. 2 Guizot, Gouvernement représentatif, Vol. I, p. 259. 3 Edinburgh Review. Vol. C, p. 229. 7 READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 8 [page 29] … The average number [of voters] must, therefore, be computed and recorded; and, for this purpose, a very simple arrangement will suffice. It is only necessary to collect and make known, from time to time, the number of electors…. For the present purpose … the Registrar-General gathers statistics … [page 30] The Registrars shall … certify to the Speaker of the House of Commons the aggregate number of electors in the constituencies of England, Scotland, and Ireland, respectively. The Speaker of the House of Commons shall … state the … total number of electors, divided by 654 [i.e. the number of seats in the House of Commons at that time] … and thenceforth, until the next ensuing [census] … the number of the said quotient shall be the quota, or number, of votes for members to be returned to serve in Parliament at any General Election to be held before such ensuing [census]… … [page 36] The adoption of the principle that a quota of electors … may return a representative, would … enable every individual elector—who shall [disagree with] the choice that the majority of the constituency in which he happens to be registered is disposed to make … — to exercise his vote according to his own judgment…. [page 47] In the ancient and historical form of our constitutional system, the right … of [electing] representatives in Parliament, was given … to the various detached and distinct communities in the then existing divisions of counties, cities, or boroughs …. In the remodeling of the electoral system in 1832, … the reverse of this was … pursued. Communities, districts, or boroughs were then created … without any further basis of connections [page 48] than that of electing representatives. The representation is not given to the borough, because it is a borough; but [rather] the borough is created in order to give it representation. … The experience of a quarter of a century does not encourage the extensions of the system of arbitrary divisions, constructed entirely for electoral purposes. A representative system, resting on such a basis, can scarcely be otherwise than a source of discord…. 8 READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 9 [page 49] The people of this country have always evinced great reluctance to be arbitrarily parcelled out, formed into sections, and divided … to correspond with a theory, and they have commonly cast aside, at the first opportunity, such artificial limits. The advocates of equal electoral divisions, who look to a new geographical distribution as the only means of accomplishing their object, will have to surmount great prejudices before they succeed in dividing the country like a chess-board. Many of these prejudices … deserve the respect, rather than the contempt, of the legislator…. “We begin our public affections in families.… We pass on to our neighborhoods, and our habitual provincial connections…. [page 50] [S]uch divisions of our country as have been formed by habit, and not by a sudden jerk of authority, are so many little images of the great country in which the heart finds something which it can fill…. But no man ever was attached by a sense of pride … to a description of square measurement….”4 The glaring anomalies and inconsistencies of a system which enables a great number of the members of the House of Commons to be elected by towns insignificant in wealth and population when compared with other places, often in their immediate neighborhood, which are without such powers … renders some extensive alteration indispensable, if the representation is to be placed on a rational or satisfactory basis…. [page 51] In order to [do this], … the combination of several of the smaller boroughs into single electoral districts [has been suggested]…. [page 52] In favour of the formation of groups of … boroughs, there is much more to be said…. [But even so, i]t must be asked—what insurmountable necessity arises from the circumstance that the town A is half a dozen miles, or an hour’s ride, from the town B, that the towns A and B must necessarily agree to- [page 53] gether in the choice of a representative; whilst it is at least equally possible that there may be less sympathy between many of the electors of A and the electors of B than between them and others in distant towns, or in the metropolis? If the accident of geographical propinquity [i.e. closeness], or any other cause, creates this necessity—whether for moral or physical reasons—it must be submitted to; but if there be no moral or physical necessity for such a combination, it certainly cannot be the duty of a 4[Burke, Reflections,] p. 290. 9 READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 10 wise legislator artificially to create it. It is not his [place] to raise legal or technical obstacles … to the free action of mankind. … [page 90] It is but too obvious that the traditional method of filling the House of Commons—suitable as it was in earlier times, when a few master minds directed all public affairs, and the people came together, not to reason, but simply to confirm what their leaders had done, or proposed to do, is unsuited to this day…. CITATION In references list Hare, Thomas. 1859. A Treatise on the Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal. London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, and Roberts. In text If your citation uses a direct quote, use this format: (Hare 1859, page number) If your citation does NOT use a direct quote, use this: (Hare 1859) 10 READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 11 B.C. voted on proportional representation - but we largely already have it BY Russ Husum British Columbia voters have just finished voting in yet another electoral reform referendum …. Proponents of proportional representation (PR) want each political party’s percentage of seats gained in the legislature to reflect each party’s percentage of the popular vote. But by that measure, our current electoral system is actually already reasonably proportional. Last year’s provincial election was an example: just over 86 per cent of the seats in the British Columbia legislature are representative of the votes cast. Furthermore, when applying that same standard of measure to the 1996, 2005, 2009, and 2013 B.C. elections, the average proportionality level exceeded 89 per cent. Here’s the math: In the 2017 election, the Liberals and NDP received 41.4 and 41.3 per cent of the popular vote, adjusted for unused ballots, while the Greens won 17 per cent. PR advocates suggest the seats in the legislature should be proportional to those numbers. Instead, the Liberals wound up with 49 per cent of the seats in the legislature, the NDP with 47 and the Greens with only 3.5 per cent. According to PR ideology, the Liberals and NDP were only rightfully entitled to the 41.4 and 41.3 per cent of the seats they won. The Green Party, although shortchanged for seats, was still rightfully entitled to the full 3.5 per cent of the seats they won. Those three percentages total 86.2 per cent and that total percentage indicates the level of proportionality received by B.C. voters in 2017. The B.C. proportionality levels are similar to proportionality levels for the last four elections in Ireland, the only major Western world country using Single Transferable Vote (STV) for federal elections. In 2004, the B.C. Citizens’ Assembly proposed STV. In the 2018 referendum, STV was the urban component of the Rural-Urban proposal. An outlier is the 2001 B.C. election where 77 of 79 seats went Liberal and the proportionality level was only 65 per cent. However, so decisive was the Liberal victory that they still would have won almost two-thirds of the seats using PR. Besides disproportionality, PR advocates also claim that half the votes are wasted or elect no one in Canadian elections. (Fair Vote Canada champions those claims, stating that over 90 per cent of voters “helped elect a representative” in Sweden, Denmark and New Zealand compared to only 50.7 per cent who “helped elect a representative” in the 2017 B.C. election.) 11 READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 12 B.C. voters don’t help elect representatives; they directly elect them. Voters mark an X beside a candidate of their choice and the candidate with the most votes wins. Voters see results on election night and understand the process from start to finish. But in countries like Sweden, Denmark and New Zealand, complex proportionality calculations are applied after the votes are counted to ensure their parliaments reflect the vote percentages. That means that in Sweden in 2014 and Denmark in 2015 only 8.1 and 36.4 per cent of voters actually directly elected a representative, resulting in over 90 per cent of representatives in both countries getting in with less than 5 per cent of the popular vote. In New Zealand, 42 per cent of the representatives are assigned by the parties; the rest are directly elected by just over half of the voters. In short, countries like Sweden, Denmark and New Zealand that use PR have a much smaller or almost non-existent connection between the voters and their representatives. Ballots, especially in Denmark and Sweden, are larger too. Denmark averages over 100 candidates per ballot with roughly 10 candidates per party. In Sweden, each political party has its own ballot, many with 50-plus candidates per ballot, resulting in hundreds of candidates running in each constituency. In both countries voters have one choice only; either for the party or for a candidate. Not surprisingly only 25 per cent of Swedish voters and 50 per cent of Danish voters actually voted for a candidate. The rest simply voted for their party. The utopian world of PR where every vote counts and almost every voter “helps elect a representative” suddenly develops numerous gaping cracks upon closer examination. The irony is that PR proponents, who endlessly decry Canadian voters being cheated by our electoral system, had no objection to a fraction of B.C. voters choosing a new electoral system that was short on specifics and that few understood. No minimum participation rate was set and the referendum was designed to clearly favour the yes vote. If voters’ interests and maximum voter input had indeed been paramount, a specific PR model backed by a solid education program would have been offered and the referendum held with the next election. CITATION In references list Husum, Russ. 2018. “B.C. voted on proportional representation - but we largely already have it.” The Globe and Mail, 10 December. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-bc-voted-on proportional-representation-but-we-largely-already/. Accessed 25 December 2018. In text (Husum 2018) [note: there are no page numbers in this source] 12 READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 13 Choosing MMP in New Zealand: Explaining the 1993 Electoral Reform BY David Denemark [Page 71] The Mixed-Member Proportional representation system [MMP] that was approved at the November 6, 1993 referendum in New Zealand derives closely from the system utilized in Germany. Voters have two votes: one for a candidate to represent their local constituency (elected, as traditionally, using plurality rules) and one for a list of published, pre-selected and ranked candidates on party lists. Tallies of the list vote are used to determine each party’s proportion in the 120-member unicameral parliament—of which 65 members are to be constituency legislators, and 55 elected from the party lists. Separate Maori seats are preserved [for New Zealand’s indigenous people]—the exact number (and thus the share of other seats) to vary depending on population and the number of Maori opting to register on the Maori roll … [Note: these numbers have changed over time so that the number of district seats has risen to 72 (65 general and 7 Maori) and the number of list seats has fallen to 48.] If a party’s list vote exceeds the 5% … threshold … and its number of elected constituency legislators under-represents the proportionate level of support in the list votes, then list candidates … will be declared elected in order to bring the party’s total number of MPs as close as possible to its proportion of the list vote. If a party fails to exceed the 5% … threshold, but wins at least one constituency seat outright, that party will be assigned its proportion of seats from the ranks of the list candidates. … If a party wins more constituency seats than the total number of seats to which it is entitled overall (“overhang”), the party retains all of its constituency seats, but does not share in the distribution of list seats.… [The size of the overall parliament increases by the total number of overhang received by all the parties combined. In the most recent election, there were 3 overhang seats in total, and the size of Parliament increased from 120 to 123.] … [page 84] … New Zealand’s voters were given the chance to transform the fate of the nation’s electoral system through an ironic, vote-motivated set of maneuvers by the major parties, which were intent on creating the [illusion] of accommodating voters’ concerns for electoral reform while, in fact, remaining fundamentally opposed to change. The strategic decisions to create a Royal Commission on the Electoral System, and to conduct an indicative referendum (September 1992) and then a binding 13 READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 14 referendum (November 1993) on electoral reform, reflected precisely the major party arrogance that voters ultimately were allowed to punish in the two referendums. … [page 86] … The following is a list of advantages and disadvantages of the MMP electoral system presented by the New Zealand Royal Commission’s research officer: Advantages • High degree of proportionality • Minor parties encouraged • Encourages consensus decision-making • High turn-outs • Retains single-member constituencies [page 87] • Allows parties to appoint women, experts, or minorities • Flexibility (possibility [for a voter] to endorse or oppose a candidate while still registering support for the party) • Few “wasted” votes, even in “safe” constituencies • Able candidates in marginal electorates can be retained, despite adverse sings, because of the list system • Allows parties to have representation in areas where they cannot win single-seat districts • Can be used to free-up cabinet members from electorate duties • Coalition government is a more attractive option to moderates within each major party than to extreme factions • The threshold provides near proportionality for strong parties but a plurality effect for weaker parties • The limited number of parties (and hence coalition options) contributes to stability and encourages moderate policies Disadvantages • A substantial increase in the number of seats required, or there would be a marked increase in the size of electoral [districts] (a particular problem in rural areas) • Potential for manipulation, especially with coalition deals • Successful minor parties would attain undue power • Parties not voters would determine governments • Party lists offer considerable influence to parties; e.g. candidates rejected by the electorates could be “elected” by the party list • Complexity of the system with the confusion of the two ballots • Two classes of MP may develop with list MPs treated as inferior • The system is merely a means of disguising a party list system • Government change may not take place at general elections • No guarantee that the most popular party will gain even a share of government 14 READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 15 All things considered, the Royal Commission recommended the abandonment of the plurality system because, despite its effective representation of constituencies and its constructive role for parties in parliament, it viewed plurality’s under-representation of minorities and small parties as “grossly unfair” (RCES 1986: 28)—a lack of justice that was felt to be “totally unacceptable and outweighed the positive feature of the system” (Boston 1987b: 111). … … [page 88] All told, the Royal Commission’s report slammed the plurality system as “unfair” and “unrepresentative” while it strongly supported MMP as a way to maximize the representation of the diverse interests and opinions of the New Zealand [voters] and to promote a long-frustrated desire among the voters for the renewal of popular accountability. In so doing, the Commission’s criticisms of the existing system’s failings provided a “direct link” between voters’ diffuse sense of political disillusionment and the cause of electoral reform. … CITATION In references list Denemark, David. 2001. “Choosing MMP in New Zealand: Explaining the 1993 Electoral Reform.” In Matthew Soberg Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds. Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?. New York: Oxford University Press. 71-95. In text If your citation uses a direct quote, use this format: (Denemark 2001, page number) If your citation does NOT use a direct quote, use this: (Denemark 2001) 15 READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 16 The Impact of Mixed-member Proportional Representation in Scotland and Wales: Lessons from Germany? BY Thomas Carl Lundberg [page 4] Devolution of power in Britain to the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales has changed the British constitution in many ways. One important change is found in how the newly devolved legislatures are elected. For the first time in the United Kingdom’s history, a form of proportional representation (PR), known locally as the Additional Member System, has been used. Referred to elsewhere as Mixed-member Proportional (MMP), variations on this model, based on that of the German Bundestag, have been adopted by many countries around the world recently. Mixed member electoral systems are usually characterised by the election of some deputies in single-member constituencies while others are elected from party lists using some form of PR. The introduction of the mixed-member system to Britain, however, has been very controversial, not only due to a cultural distaste for the coalition or minority governments that are likely to arise, but also because of fears that mixed-member PR creates two “classes” of representatives. The main fear is that representatives indirectly elected from party lists, rather than directly elected in single-member constituencies, will be more oriented towards their parties than the voters. The same concern has also arisen in New Zealand, where list members, who comprise almost half the membership of the House of Representatives, “have been referred to as ‘second-class’ by the media, parliamentary colleagues and the public alike” (Ward 1998: 127). In Germany, however, it is generally assumed that representatives elected from party lists are not tarred with any second-class status, although scholarly investigations into the existence of any distinction between the two types of legislators have been infrequent. … [page 7] Germany’s Reichstag did use single-member constituencies for the election of its deputies from 1871 to 1918, with universal male suffrage, but under a double ballot runoff system that penalised the Social Democrats (Jesse 2000:125). When universal suffrage was granted with the introduction of the Weimar Republic, a large constituency, closed-list PR system was deliberately chosen by Social Democratic and leftist Liberal leaders to undermine the grip of conservative local bourgeois elites so that “There was no possible way for a deputy to be connected with a district” (Suval 1985: 249). Consequently, there were complaints about the impersonal and remote nature of the relationship 16 READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 17 between Reichstag deputies and their constituents, and attempts were made to reform the system in the direction of greater personalisation before the rise of the National Socialists and the demise of Weimar (Jesse 2000: 126). After Germany’s defeat in the Second World War, British occupation zone administrators insisted on reversing what they considered to be an impersonal representative tradition by requiring that municipal elections held in 1946 be predominantly candidate based, but they conceded a party list PR element at the request of the parties (Ebsworth 1960: 53-5). The resulting hybrid became the model for the contemporary mixed system (although imperial Germany and Denmark briefly used mixed-member systems before 1920). The mixed candidate/party list system was later used for all federal state parliament (Landtag) [page 8] elections in the British occupation zone, while military governments in the American and French zones allowed “pure” list PR (Ebsworth 1960: 61-2). The British-inspired compromise model caught on with German authorities, however, so that later the first Bundestag election in 1949 used an electoral system based on that of the Landtag of Lower Saxony, in the British zone (Ebsworth 1960: 65; 75). The current system used for the Bundestag and most federal state assemblies (Landtage) involves a vote for a candidate in a single-member constituency (with the winner chosen by plurality), and another vote for a party list (ranked by statewide party organisations). Candidates from state lists are elected in numbers that make the total number of representatives (constituency and list members added together), on a partisan basis, proportional to the party vote tallied nationally. … Whether Germany’s mixed system of constituency and party list representatives actually does enhance the relationship voters have with those they elect is the subject of some dispute in the literature. Max Kaase, a German critic, argues “the initial expectations in designing the personalized PR system with respect to citizen deputy ties have certainly not materialized” (1984: 163). British critic Charlie Jeffery agrees, claiming that “a continuous link between voters and MPs in a particular area does not have the significance attached to constituency representation in the UK” (Jeffery 1998: 246). Some authors criticise the electoral system for not being genuinely personalised, while others claim that Germans historically take their grievances to officials other than elected representatives. In either instance, critics would claim that there is no justification for the mixed electoral system. Ultimately, the main observation is that Germans citizens generally do not distinguish between directly elected and party list representatives, and there is no “caste” system in which one type of representative is seen as 17 READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 18 more legitimate than the other (Burkett 1985: 130). In fact, dual candidacy (constituency candidates being on party lists as well to ensure election) is common, with the “losing” candidate in the direct constituency elections often winning a Bundestag seat from that constituency’s Land party list. This phenomenon is one reason why Eckhard Jesse states that the voter “does not perceive the difference at all” between the two different types of representatives (Jesse 1988: 120). However, Vernon Bogdanor is exaggerating when he asserts that “Members of the Bundestag, unlike elected representatives in Britain, are not expected to involve themselves in constituency work” (1999: 225). German political scientist Werner Patzelt reports that in Germany, “it is obvious that for an MP the constituency work is a critical part of holding his office. Consequently, the representatives devote about one-third of their working hours to constituency work” (Patzelt 1997: 60). Indeed, Patzelt’s research reveals that constituent demands are so great that Bundestag members “are expected to act as ombudsmen with far more rigour than they feel should be expected of them” (Patzelt 1997: 72). Furthermore, Germans approach both party list and constituency [page 9] representatives, with both types receiving similar amounts of correspondence (Burkett 1985: 129). Which representative is contacted by citizens seems to depend on party identification: “If ‘their’ party lost in the constituency they may prefer to approach the List deputy of that party, especially if he or she was the unsuccessful candidate of the party in that constituency” (Burkett 1985: 129). “Losing” constituency candidates who end up being elected via the party list often shadow the candidate who defeated them, setting up shop in the same constituency. While most accounts of the German electoral system state that there is no difference in the status of party list and constituency representatives, some scholars say there is a difference between the role orientations and behaviour of representatives. New evidence from Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Bernhard Wessels shows that party list and constituency members of the Bundestag differ with respect to both the style and focus of representation, causing the authors to conclude that “type of mandate makes a difference for role orientation” (Klingemann and Wessels 2001: 292). An earlier study by Thomas Lancaster and David Patterson found that “district type affects representatives’ perceptions of pork barrel allocations as a special type of constituency service” (Lancaster and Patterson 1990: 458). Werner Patzelt writes that Bundestag members elected in single-member constituencies “regard themselves more as successful representatives of the citizens, clearly invest more time in constituency work, and engage much more in case work and constituency service” than their list-elected colleagues 18 READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 19 (1999:37). However, Patzelt goes on to say that those major party members who were defeated in single member constituency races but enter the Bundestag or Landtage as list members behave like directly elected constituency members (1999: 38-9). The main behavioural differences appear to exist between the deputies of major (Social Democrat and Christian Democrat) and minor parties (including the Greens, the Free Democrats, and eastern Germany’s Party of Democratic Socialism); the latter are more focused on interest groups and policy making than on geographical constituencies, largely due to the simple fact that they have fewer MPs (Patzelt 1999: 39). … … [In order to find out how different kinds of legislators view their roles,] a postal survey was used to gather information from members of German and British legislatures. Two German Landtage, those of Brandenburg and Hesse, were chosen because they use the two-vote electoral system used by the Bundestag, as well as the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales…. … [page 10] … [In the two German states,] a difference exists … between major and minor party deputies on their responses to the importance of representing the collective views of their voters. The same difference exists between constituency and list members, as well as major and minor party deputies, on the issue of enacting the party’s manifesto commitments [i.e. the party’s campaign promises] into law. The … difference is again present on the matter of enhancing the party’s strength, but only between constituency and list members. These differences suggest that in Germany, minor party and list-elected representatives are somewhat more oriented towards their parties than constituency members. On all of these points … there was no statistically significant difference between constituency and list members in Scotland and Wales. The potential for conflict between constituency and partisan roles was examined by … asking legislators what their primary motivation for standing for office was … A significant difference … is present between the responses of German constituency and list representatives, suggesting that list members are more motivated by policy and partisan goals. The difference between constituency and list members in Scotland and Wales was not statistically significant, and the response “serving the needs of your constituents/voters” was given by over 55% of British representatives, compared to 40.4% of German Landtag members. Other survey results, however, show significant differences between constituency and list members in both Germany and in Scotland and Wales. When questioned as to how important their 19 READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 20 success in obtaining projects for their constituencies or regions was to their re-election prospects, there were highly significant differences between German Landtag constituency and list members, as well as between major and minor party deputies … There was also a difference … between the responses from Scottish and Welsh constituency and list members. The same difference between the two types of German and British members exists in response to how important helping voters is to their re-election prospects … [page 11] … When asked about obtaining projects for their constituency or federal state (Land), 20.2% of Landtag members said it was very important to their re-election prospects, while 54.2% of their Scottish and Welsh counterparts responded the same way. As far as helping people who have problems with government agencies, 36% of Landtag members consider this very important to their re-election, while 54.2% of Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly members feel the same way. For all the representatives, there seems to be an electoral incentive to serve constituents, but it appears to be stronger for those directly elected in single-member constituencies, particularly in Scotland and Wales. Remarkable similarities are found again among German and British representatives’ attitudes towards the electoral system, assessed by asking about how they feel about each other.… In Germany, 67.5% of constituency members agree or agree strongly [that members elected from single-member districts are more accountable to voters than members elected on the party lists] (compared to 26.6% of list members), while 90.0% of their counterparts in Scotland and Wales feel the same way (compared to 28.2% of list members).… While both constituency and list members agree or strongly agree that both types of member are equally representative of their people, the difference between constituency and list member responses is again significant… Among German constituency members, 62.5% agree or agree strongly with the statement (compared to 93.9% of list members), while 69.7% of Scottish and Welsh constituency members responded the same way (compared to 94.8% of list members). These results show that despite being the products of different political cultures, both German and British representatives have strikingly similar views on the accountability and representative nature of legislators, views that seem to be influenced by their place in the electoral system itself. … [page 20] In Germany, … Landtag deputies elected in single-member constituencies [are] closer to their constituents than party list members, but often only slight differences in response were found. Most of the differences between the two types of member are not statistically significant, although those that are 20 READINGS FOR Position Paper #4: Comparative Electoral Systems 21 reveal that list members are somewhat more oriented towards their parties than constituency members, while constituency members are more focused on constituents. In particular, constituency members are more eager to promote their constituencies and seek projects for them than their list counterparts … Constituency members are also more successful in gaining public spending projects when they seek them, and [page 21] view this success, as well as helping constituents in general, as important to their reelection effort. Party list members seem more concerned than their constituency counterparts about the party’s strength, getting manifesto pledges enacted, and maintaining the party leader’s support. List members also appear more motivated to enter politics out of a desire to get their parties’ policies enacted than constituency members, who are more motivated to serve constituents. In Scotland and Wales, … the two types of representative do not do their jobs very differently. There does, however, appear to be more contact between constituency members and voters, and between list members and interest groups … Party list members also appear to be more concerned, when it comes to re-election, about the national strength of their party and having their leader’s support. Otherwise, most differences between the activities and attitudes of the two types of members are not statistically significant. Both types of representative are highly partisan, and both are assuming active constituency roles. List members spend almost as much of their work time helping voters with their problems as constituency members do, and they also promote themselves heavily in their regions, making media appearances and attending meetings. … CITATION In references list Lundberg, Thomas Carl. 2003. “The Impact of Mixed-member Proportional Representation in Scotland and Wales: Lessons from Germany?” Keele European Parties Research Unit Working Paper 20. Staffordshire, UK: Keele University. https://www.keele.ac.uk/media/keeleuniversity/group/kepru/KEPRU%20WP%2020.pdf. Accessed: 11 December 2024. In text If your citation uses a direct quote, use this format: (Lundberg 2003, page number) If your citation does NOT use a direct quote, use this: (Lundberg 2003) 21

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